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ABSTRACT. Balancing interests to achieve legitimate and effective policies is a primary and pressing challenge in countries’ efforts to
prepare their national reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) strategies. Using Tanzania as a country
case, we investigated the most polarizing policy discourses and assessed the influence of competing discourse coalitions on the drafting
of the national REDD+ strategy. We combined discourse and social network analysis to identify discourse coalitions and assess their
influence. The findings indicate that the national REDD+ strategy largely reflects the positions of the discourse coalition that is
controlled by powerful state actors who support central control of REDD+ financial mechanisms. The competing coalition, led by
civil society organizations, has limited influence on the national strategy, despite discursive congruence and concerted political action.
The findings further indicate that discursive practices and institutional rules codetermine policy outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
(REDD+) is a climate change mitigation mechanism based on
the idea of rewards or incentives for the maintenance and
enhancement of carbon stocks in tropical forests, the loss of which
currently accounts for up to 12–20% of global greenhouse gas
emissions (Van der Werf et al. 2009). The Bali Action Plan,
adopted at the 13th Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2007, laid
out the framework for countries to start preparing for a post-
Kyoto climate change agreement involving REDD+ actions:
demonstrated emission reductions through improved forest
protection, sustainable forest management, and/or enhancement
of carbon stocks (UNFCCC 2008). Multilateral and bilateral
financial instruments to facilitate these preparations, such as the
World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, Norway’s
International Climate and Forest Initiative, and the United
Nations REDD+ (UN-REDD) Programme, were launched. A
growing number of developing countries are formulating national
REDD+ strategies and policies (Angelsen et al. 2009, Kanowski
et al. 2011, Den Besten et al. 2014).  
For a country to meet its REDD+ targets in its specific and
dynamic national context, it will require effective coordination
and actions from a range of actors at national and subnational
levels (Angelsen et al. 2009). These actors include governmental
agencies, local communities constituting forest custodians and
users, environmental and development nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), businesses in sectors that drive
deforestation and forest degradation or engage in REDD+
actions, and transnational actors, such as foreign governments
and intergovernmental organizations that support national
REDD+ preparation. National REDD+ processes thus represent
multiactor, multilevel governance (Forsyth 2009) in action,
characterized by a move away from government-centered policy
making toward more inclusive, participatory forms of policy
formulation and implementation, driven by expectations of
subsequent greater effectiveness and legitimacy of the policies
(Arts 2012). However, the various actors involved are likely to
differ a great deal in their interests and understanding with regard
to optimal REDD+ policies, concerning such issues as the
appropriate scale for accounting and benefit sharing in REDD+,
environmental and social cobenefits, and participation and rights
of local and indigenous communities (Angelsen et al. 2008,
Forsyth 2009, Peskett and Brockhaus 2009). The extent to which
different voices are heard and influence REDD+ policies will be
conditioned by the agency of more or less powerful actors
embedded in social and political hierarchies, coalitions and
networks, and the institutions that define the rules of the game
for the policy process (Arts and Buizer 2009, Peskett and
Brockhaus 2009).  
We analyze the struggle of organizational actors involved in
formulating the national REDD+ strategy in Tanzania to
promote their ideas about REDD+ challenges and appropriate
solutions, and the factors that shape their influence on a key policy
output, i.e., the national REDD+ strategy. The analysis is based
on the premise that what constitutes appropriate mechanisms to
ensure environmentally effective and socially equitable REDD+
is socially constructed, rooted in the distinctive worldviews of
policy actors, and influenced by discursive contests involving
deliberation, the coproduction of ideas, and argumentation
(Fischer and Forester 1993, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). We were
informed by theories of discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993, 1995)
and discursive institutional analysis (Arts and Buizer 2009, Den
Besten et al. 2014). Our main theoretical and methodological
contribution is the combination of the analysis of policy
discourses, i.e., language and action used to give meaning to
reality (cf. Hajer 1995), with social network measures of power
relations. We also pay attention to institutional path dependencies
(cf. Brockhaus et al., in press), as well as to feedback loops between
discourses and institutions. Our approach allows us not only to
identify distinct discourse coalitions but also to empirically assess
dominance based on differential power. Our aim is to enhance
understanding of policy conflict and of the influence of each
group of policy actors on REDD+ policy outputs in Tanzania,
thus examining the promise of multiactor governance in light of
empirical data. We focus on two research questions: (1) What are
the polarizing issues that characterize discourse coalitions,
formed by organizational actors involved in REDD+ strategy
formulation in Tanzania, and what kind of differential framing
of the key challenges for REDD+ and the appropriate policy
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responses are they based on? (2) What is the influence of each
discourse coalition on the national REDD+ strategy, and which
factors condition their influence?
METHODS
Theoretical background and approach
Discursive approaches to environmental and forest policy analysis
(cf. Fischer and Forester 1993, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, Arts
and Buizer 2009) draw attention to policy processes as contests
between forms of discourse, that is, the language and practices
through which meaning is given to physical and social realities,
including policy problems and their potential solutions (Arts and
Buizer 2009, Den Besten et al. 2014). The coexistence of distinct
and competing discourses leads policy actors to form coalitions
to strengthen certain discourses and constrain others (Hajer 1993,
1995, Arts and Buizer 2009). Following Hajer (1993:47), we define
a discourse coalition as an “ensemble of a set of storylines, the
actors that utter these storylines, and the practices that conform
to these storylines.” Story lines are political devices through which
actors try to impose their views and perception of interests
regarding a policy problem on others and to critique and constrain
competing views (Hajer 1993). They are essentially narratives of
the reality as constructed by social actors, who assemble frames
that can be defined as “selectively encoded and punctuated
objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions
within one’s past and present environment” (Snow and Benford
1992:137). Frames may be diagnostic, i.e., identifying and
attributing problems, or prognostic, i.e., identifying solutions, and
they may motivate political action (Benford and Snow 2000).
Politically successful story lines are said to combine all three
elements, while linking facts, values, and action (Hajer and Laws
2006, Leifeld and Haunss 2012). By gaining wider acceptance,
shared story lines can help reduce fragmentation and approach
problem closure (Hajer 1995). 
Discourse becomes institutionalized when the story lines
articulated by a coalition come to be acted upon in the policy
process, for instance through outputs such as policy documents
(Hajer 1995). Policy texts may thus be seen as playing a mediating
role between discourse and action (Phillips et al. 2004, cited in
Arts and Buizer 2009). In addition to the more far-reaching role
of policy texts in institutional reproduction, we consider that they
may be important triggers of immediate strategic action in the
policy process (cf. Den Besten et al. 2014). Draft texts in particular
may offer tangible “hooks” for actors that seek to engage in the
deliberative exchange to comment on and critique policy
proposals and to propose alternatives. Frequently, formal
solicitation of comments from actors forms an institutionalized
part of the policy drafting process in the multilevel governance
framework. In addition, strategic action as a response to policy
proposals may be manifested through so-called protest events:
“collective, public action regarding issues in which explicit
concerns around [e.g., REDD+] are expressed as an important
dimension, organized by non-state instigators with the explicit
purpose of critique or dissent together with societal and/or
political demands” (Fillieule and Jiménez 2003:273). In line with
the previous conceptualization, we consider that the target of
protest action may be the content of the policy proposal, i.e., story
lines and/or the institutional rules that guide the policy process,
governing participation in agenda setting, decision making, and
resource allocation. Institutions may thus be seen as both the
outputs or outcomes of policy processes that discourse coalitions
respond to, forming a spiral of action, discourse
institutionalization, and counteraction, as well as the boundaries
that shape the action and agency of the actors involved (Den
Besten et al. 2014).  
Hajer (1993) suggests that the institutional practices of the policy
process reflect the ideas of the dominant coalition, following the
acceptance of the discourse of the dominant coalition by
influential actors. This draws our attention to the power relations
in the policy domain, particularly to the actors’ ability to mobilize
support (Arts and Buizer 2009). Influence may also indicate
authority, lending legitimacy to the story lines of the dominant
coalition. Leifeld and Haunss (2012) further observe that
successful discourse coalitions are stable over time with regard to
their core frames and actors; show high intracoalition ideational
congruence; appear united against competitors, suggesting
coordinated political action; attract a large constituency;
dominate the core frames of a conflict; and employ the core frames
effectively in consistent story lines.
Study context and data collection
The drafting of a national REDD+ strategy was begun in
Tanzania in 2008 when the government established a bilateral
partnership on climate change with Norway. The partnership
facilitates not only the strategy development but also subnational
pilot REDD+ projects and REDD+ research and capacity
building. Led by the government REDD+ Task Force, the
formulation of the national REDD+ strategy has involved a series
of stakeholder consultations, including with representatives of
regional and local governments, civil society organizations
(CSOs) including NGOs and the private sector, and international
and multilateral actors, and it has drawn on inputs from REDD+
pilot projects and in-depth studies (http://www.reddtz.org; URT
2013b). 
This research was undertaken in Tanzania between March and
June 2011 at the time when public consultations to solicit
comments on the first draft of the national REDD+ strategy were
under way. The overall research design has been described by
Brockhaus and Di Gregorio (2012) and Rantala (2012). 
The first step was the identification of the organizational
boundaries of the REDD+ policy domain (Laumann et al. 1992)
through individual consultations with 7 experts involved in the
national REDD+ initiative. Those organizations mentioned at
least 4 times were considered relevant REDD+ policy actors. A
departure from this criterion was the inclusion of 3 domestic
business organizations (consultants) because of their known
formal role in the policy process. One organization that declined
having any interest in the national REDD+ process, despite being
mentioned by the expert panel, was excluded. Representatives of
53 organizations out of the identified 56 (95%) that normally
represented their organizations in the national REDD+ process
responded to a structured survey. Semistructured, qualitative
interviews were conducted with 41 of these organizational actors,
either with the same representative or a higher-ranking official
who could plausibly represent the position of the whole
organization.  
Ecology and Society 19(2): 66
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art66/
In our mixed-methods approach (cf. Edwards 2010), we drew on
3 sources of information to identify the core competing discourses
of the policy debate: the organizational survey, semistructured
interviews, and public statements released by policy actors. In the
survey, respondents indicated the position of their organization,
i.e., agree/disagree/neutral/no knowledge, with regard to 35
predefined stances on REDD+ design, challenges, and
governance drawn from the existing literature on REDD+ policy
debates. We analyzed the distribution of the responses to identify
the stances on which the respondents’ opinions were the most
divided, i.e., a high number of both agreement and disagreement
responses. Analysis of transcribed qualitative interview data and
of public statements, i.e., policy briefs, reports, and feedback
documents, by some of the actors (TFWG 2009, 2010, TFCG et
al. 2010, 2012, REDD Pilot Projects 2011, TFCG and MJUMITA
2011), coded using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis
freeware, deepened our understanding of the divergent frames
and story lines regarding key REDD+ challenges and appropriate
solutions and determined the identification of the most polarizing
policy issues. Membership in a discourse coalition was also
assigned based on the 3 sources of data: according to the
organization’s position on the contentious stances as expressed in
the survey and based on triangulation with the qualitative
interview and document data. For instance, if  an actor indicated
a neutral position on the key survey stance but clearly sided with
one of the core conflict discourses in the qualitative interview data
and/or a related public statement, that actor was assigned to a
coalition based on the latter source. Conversely, if  an actor agreed
or disagreed with the survey stance, but the other data did not
support this position, that actor would not be assigned to a
coalition. For most actors, however, the 3 sources of data were
aligned to support a similar classification.  
The survey and the semistructured interviews also solicited
information regarding actions taken by organizations with the
aim of influencing policy, including participation in protest events
identified by the expert panel. The public statements that were
included in the analysis of the core discourses were frequently
released as part of the protest events. 
We constructed a two-mode discourse network that depicts policy
actors, i.e., first-mode nodes, and their position on the contentious
stances in the survey, i.e., second-mode node (Fig. 1; Borgatti and
Everett 1997, Fisher et al. 2013). The ties between first- and
second-mode nodes represent either agreement or disagreement
with the stances. In addition, data on the reputational power of
policy actors (Knoke et al. 1996, Hirschi et al. 2013) were collected
through the following survey question: “Please indicate those
organizations that stand out as especially influential on domestic
REDD+ policies.” Respondents selected organizations from the
list of all policy actors identified as being part of the REDD+
policy domain and included in the survey. Following existing
literature on reputational power, we used the indegree centrality
measure in social network analysis to ascertain actors’ level of
influence (Laumann et al. 1977, Kriesi et al. 2006, Fischer et al.
2009). The influence of discourse coalitions was measured by the
average of normalized indegrees of coalition members (Freeman
1978-1979, Borgatti et al. 2002). Normalized indegree centrality
of an actor is the proportion of the actual mentions, i.e., incoming
ties, of an actor divided by all possible incoming ties (Scott 2000).
In other words, it measures how often a policy actor has been
mentioned as influential in relation to all possible nominations.
The higher the measure of indegree centrality, the more influential
an actor is. As part of the broader study, we also asked the actors
to name organizational partners in information exchange related
to REDD+. There was a significant positive correlation between
actor centrality in networks of information exchange and of
influence (Rantala 2012), supporting the use of the reputational
power measure to indicate influence.  
A key limitation of the study was that we collected interview data
at only one point in time, so we could not investigate changes in
actor discourses and influence over time. The temporal dimension
was instead addressed by comparing policy outputs, namely the
national REDD+ strategy drafts, produced at different points in
time with the frames and story lines of the discourse coalitions
as evidence of discourse institutionalization. The policy outputs
included the first (December 2010; URT 2010) and second (June
2012; URT 2012) draft national REDD+ strategies and a revised
summary from November 2011 (URT 2011), as well as the final
strategy dated February 2013 (URT 2013b). One coder, the first
author, coded the qualitative interview data and all the
documents.
RESULTS
The organizational composition of the REDD+ policy actors
interviewed in 2011 is presented in Table 1. Government executive
departments and domestic NGOs were the most represented
policy actors in Tanzania.
Table 1. Organizational composition of the REDD+ policy actors
in Tanzania in 2011.
 
Organization type No. actors %
Government executive departments,
ministries
15 28
Domestic NGOs 14 26
International NGOs 7 13
Multilateral organizations 5 9
Foreign government agencies, embassies 4 8
Domestic academic and research
institutes
4 8
Domestic businesses 3 6
Transnational business 1 2
Total 53 100
Discourse coalitions
Organizational positions in the survey data signaled high
consensus among actors on most issues. Nearly 70% of the
respondents considered REDD+ an effective policy instrument
for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions globally. Eighty-six
percent of the policy actors agreed that REDD+ needed to deliver
environmental and social cobenefits, especially for the rural poor
at the forest margins. The main challenges for REDD+ were
considered low levels of REDD+ knowledge and capacity at all
levels of governance; poor vertical and horizontal, i.e., sectoral,
coordination; and competing economic interests related to
agriculture and charcoal production. These challenges were
regarded as barriers to achieving an effective and equitable
national REDD+ strategy.  
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Fig. 1. Position of policy actors on a polarizing statement on REDD+ financial flows in Tanzania. Agreement = solid line;
disagreement = dashed line. The size of a node represents the influence of the actor (normalized in-degree centrality of influence
data). Note: Coalition membership was triangulated through the qualitative data and was not solely based on the position on the
particular survey question visualized in the graph (see “Methods”), explaining the indicated coalition boundaries. Organizations
outside of the coalition boundaries as indicated in the figure were considered neutral.
One issue was clearly characterized by divergent views as
evidenced by both the quantitative and qualitative data: how to
administer REDD+ financial flows and compensation.
Operational structures of REDD+ may function at various scales
of accounting and crediting, the options including the following:
a fully national approach, implying central government control
over accounting and distribution of REDD+ benefits;
subnational, e.g., project-based, accounting and payments
directly from international sources; or a nested approach
combining the two (Angelsen et al. 2008). We identified two main
discourse coalitions in the Tanzanian REDD+ policy domain in
relation to the administration of financial flows: one supporting
a centralized, government-controlled system of REDD+ finance
and compensation through a national REDD+ trust fund, and
the other rejecting it in favor of a nested approach. However, not
all the actors could be unequivocally assigned to one of these two
coalitions. One-third of the organizational actors presented a
neutral position toward a fully national approach, including
research and multilateral organizations and foreign government
agencies, or were not familiar enough with the issue to have an
informed opinion, i.e., certain government organizations (Table
2). Figure 1 depicts the positions of the two discourse coalitions
vis-à-vis the two divisive stances related to how to administer
REDD+ financial flows and compensation in the survey data.
The stances read: “REDD schemes should only be financed
through funds,” associated by the Tanzanian respondents with
the national trust fund proposal, and “all REDD accounting and
payments should go through the national governments.” Both
were among the 5 most divisive stances out of the 35 investigated
(Appendix 1).
Story lines
The qualitative data analysis revealed how contrasting diagnostic
frames related to governance and tenure were interwoven with
ostensibly similar motivations to promote REDD+ in the actors’
story lines. This led the two coalitions to promote distinct policy
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Table 2. Centrality of REDD+ discourse coalitions and their core organizational members, measured as the normalized indegree of
perceived influence.
 
Coalition for centralized
REDD+ rewards (n = 15)
Coalition for nested REDD+
rewards, community tenure and
safeguards (n = 20)
Neutral/no knowledge
(n = 18)
Members Government agencies (12)
International NGO (1)
Multilateral org. (1)
Foreign government (1)
National NGOs (12)
International NGOs (4)
Domestic businesses (3)
International business (1)
Government agencies (3)
Academic & research inst. (4)
National NGO (2)
International NGO (2)
Multilateral org. (4)
Foreign government (3)
Core members Task Force members in 2011
(n = 3)
Protest event leaders
(n = 10)
Mean centrality 46.03 32.50 35.26
Median centrality 44.23 31.73 29.81
Mean centrality, core
members only
75.00 39.42
 Note: Normalized indegree of perceived influence calculated as the average proportion of actual incoming ties in relation to all
possible incoming ties.
proposals regarding REDD+ financial flows. Actors strongly in
favor of central government control over REDD+ finances were
predominantly government agencies (Fig. 1). The core members
of this coalition included the most influential actors in the
REDD+ policy domain (Table 2): the state forestry and
environment departments. Together with the forestry agency of
Zanzibar, they formed the national REDD+ Task Force in 2011.
The idea of pooling all REDD+ funding, i.e., publicly and
privately sourced, and administering it through a REDD+ trust
fund was a central feature in the discourse of the task force
members. They framed REDD+ as primarily an opportunity to
channel funding to government programs in sustainable resource
management: “What we are failing to do now, we can do [it] with
REDD+” (forestry officer, April 2011). In addition to the
perceived environmental benefits, they saw central coordination
as necessary for a fair REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism,
suggesting that the government is in the best position to oversee
the equitable distribution of benefits and to protect unprepared
rural communities from the tricky business of carbon trading. 
In contrast, the main concern of the coalition for nested rewards
was that the national trust fund would prevent benefits from
reaching those who would bear most of the costs of REDD+
policies, i.e. local communities, thus jeopardizing both the social
equity and the environmental effectiveness of REDD+. The core
organizations in this coalition were CSOs, i.e., domestic and
international NGOs and a private business, implementing
REDD+ pilot projects in different parts of the country, many
with a long history of involvement in the Tanzanian forestry and
natural resource sectors. This coalition supported a national
scheme for REDD+ accounting, to avoid leakage, i.e.,
displacement of deforestation from areas under REDD+ to
surrounding areas, coupled with a benefit-sharing system that
provided for direct subnational disbursement of rewards. Their
story lines evolved around frames of ineffective and unfair
centralized benefit sharing based on previous negative experiences
of public sector financial management in Tanzania. For example:  
We think there should be a national accounting system.
But what we’re opposed to is a national reward system.
And the reason being that there’s no history in Tanzania
of the national government capturing basically rewards
from natural resources at the national level, and then
taking them to communities. (domestic NGO
representative, March 2011) 
According to the CSOs, decentralization of forestry, land, and
wildlife management had largely failed to meet expectations of
improved access to benefits from natural resources for local
communities and of increased management effectiveness. They
feared that REDD+ would repeat that experience. For instance,
guidelines on benefit sharing from Joint Forest Management,
involving community management of government forest reserves,
were still pending treasury approval 13 years into the
implementation of the Forest Policy (1998) that introduced Joint
Forest Management (S. Rantala, personal observation).  
In the interviews and public statements, CSO coalition members
emphasized the need to clarify land, forest, and carbon tenure
rules as a prerequisite for developing equitable systems of
REDD+ benefit sharing. Progressive on paper, the
implementation of the land and forest reforms was significantly
slowed down by complex procedures of land registration, the
absence of which impeded government recognition of vast areas
of village land. This formal land category was introduced as part
of the Village Land Act of 1999 to secure rural communities’ land
rights and subsequently their rights to resources on that land. The
government officials who were interviewed considered
unregistered community lands as general land, a residual category
under the control of the central government (cf. URT 2010), and
in practice open access, particularly susceptible to deforestation.
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In contrast, according to the CSOs, the key to bringing more
forests under sustainable management was more straightforward
recognition of community tenure, enabling local village
communities to manage resources on village land and access
benefits, including those related to REDD+ (cf. TFCG and
MJUMITA 2011). Another demand by the CSO coalition,
stemming from the first two concerns, was the creation and
implementation of socioeconomic and environmental safeguards
as part of the REDD+ monitoring system, which would ensure
that local people who incur the opportunity costs of REDD+
receive adequate compensation and that activities to enhance
forest carbon stocks are in line with other environmental benefits,
such as biodiversity conservation.
Action
Membership in the CSO discourse coalition was associated with
participation in protest events. In late 2010 and early 2011,
Tanzanian CSOs became concerned about delays in the national
REDD+ strategy development, which in their view had become
an increasingly closed process centered on the REDD+ Task
Force. They organized public debates on REDD+ and submitted
comments on the draft national REDD+ strategy and the
Tanzanian Readiness Preparation Proposal for the World Bank’s
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Through this strategic action,
the CSOs established their position in the policy arena, and, by
the time the current study was conducted, the core members of
this coalition, i.e., those leading the five major protest events
identified by the expert panel, were considered among the most
influential policy actors in Tanzania (Fig. 1, Table 2). The public
statements of this coalition consistently highlighted the risks of
a centralized benefit-sharing mechanism, the urgency of land and
forest tenure clarification, and the need to ensure social and
environmental safeguards (TFWG 2009, 2010, TFCG et al. 2010,
2012, REDD Pilot Projects 2011, TFCG and MJUMITA 2011).
The CSO coalition thus exhibited some of the suggested
characteristics of a successful discourse coalition (Leifeld and
Haunss 2012): stability and consistency of core actors and frames
throughout the protest events, ideational congruence among core
actors, and a united front against competitors. 
In contrast, the discourse of the key government actors about the
operationalization of policy measures on the social equity and
environmental benefits of REDD+, which they, too, said they
were striving for, remained vague and ambiguous. Despite a
number of in-depth studies on various aspects of REDD+ that
had already been commissioned by the task force (cf. URT 2013b),
they stated that a multitude of open questions remained, and
more studies were needed to inform the development of the
REDD+ structures. From the CSO coalition point of view, the
avoidance of presenting concrete measures formally and publicly
presented a major challenge to engaging the government actors
in meaningful deliberative exchange.
Influence
Table 2 presents the average indegree centrality measures of the
perceived influence for the two discourse coalitions. The neutral
actors have also been grouped for comparison. The values indicate
higher reputational power of the government-dominated
coalition and especially of the national REDD+ Task Force.
Considering the core members of the CSO coalition only, we see
that their reputational power is relatively high but still does not
match that of the government-dominated coalition.
Policy outputs
In addition to the comparison of the various versions of the
national REDD+ strategy (URT 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013b),
changes in the key REDD+ support structures observed in early
2012 provided some evidence of the impacts of the discourse
coalitions on the policy process and its outputs. In response to
public demand, the national REDD+ Task Force was expanded
to include 10 new government organizations and 1 CSO. This
CSO was one of the protest event leaders and among the 10 most
influential actors of the policy domain (Fig. 1). In addition, 5
thematic working groups were established to provide technical
advice for the national REDD+ strategy development, including
government, research, private sector, and CSOs (URT 2013b).  
Regarding the contentious issue of the administration of REDD+
rewards, all versions of the national REDD+ strategy emphasize
the need for an equitable and transparent benefit-sharing system.
The centerpiece of such a system is invariably stated to be the
national REDD+ trust fund, in line with the discourse of the
government-dominated coalition. The final strategy document
(URT 2013b) details a plan for establishing a nested baseline for
accounting, but no options for subnational crediting are
mentioned.  
Parallel to the CSO discourse, the strategy documents repeatedly
refer to the threat that unclear land and forest tenure poses to fair
REDD+ benefit sharing and are explicit about the link between
the two, although carbon rights are not specified. In what seems
to be a victory for the CSO coalition, the final strategy written in
2013 includes a reversal of the statement contained in the previous
versions (URT 2010, 2011, 2012) that unregistered village land is
general land; instead, it cites Ministry of Lands, Housing and
Human Settlement Development data that 70% of land in
Tanzania is village land and only 2% general land (URT 2013b).
Later, however, this view is contradicted with a repetition of the
statement in previous drafts: “The forest resources in the
unreserved or general land (57% of area) are open access resources
due to unclear ownership, absence of security of tenure and
formal user rights” (URT 2013b:27). The notion that the formal
recognition of communities’ land and forest tenure for access to
REDD+ benefits requires resource-intensive village land-use
planning is retained in the 2013 strategy and a related action plan
(URT 2013a), in contrast to the CSO demands. 
Another central feature of the CSO discourse, social and
environmental safeguards, was barely mentioned in the first draft
strategy from 2010 but gained greater salience in subsequent
drafts. In their comments on the second draft of 2012, the CSOs
still signaled frustration about the lack of specificity regarding
steps to develop and enforce the safeguards (TFCG et al. 2012).
In the final version of 2013, a whole chapter is dedicated to the
development of safeguards, thus recognized as an integral part
of REDD+ monitoring, reporting, and verification. It is also the
subject of one of the technical working groups.
DISCUSSION
The focus of the REDD+ policy debate in Tanzania and the
dividing line between the identified discourse coalitions closely
reflects those that may be observed in global REDD+ debates
(Den Besten et al. 2014). The rights and well-being of local
communities are pitted against government-led approaches to
REDD+ in fear of recentralization of forest governance and
appropriation of REDD+ benefits by the state (e.g., Griffiths
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2009, Phelps et al. 2010). At the same time, global REDD+
negotiations are leaning strongly toward a national approach for
reasons of environmental effectiveness, namely avoiding leakage,
and respect of national sovereignty (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and
Angelsen 2009). In specific country contexts, REDD+ design
considerations may link to previous, entrenched debates about
benefit sharing in natural resource governance. Should REDD+,
as a potential new source of funding, be used to strengthen weak
state governance or channeled directly to local communities as
compensation for the opportunity costs of forest conservation,
which they may not have been able to access previously?
Frequently, in these debates, CSOs emerge or are portrayed as
“defenders” of local forest-dependent communities (cf. http://
www.redd-monitor.org). 
A closer look at the story lines and influence of the discourse
coalitions within the institutional setting of the REDD+ strategy
process explains why the CSO coalition appeared successful in
promoting some of its key proposals, but not all. The safeguards
discourse is enjoying such attention, support, and legitimacy in
global REDD+ policy discussions (e.g., UNFCCC 2011, cf.
review by Mwayafu and Kisekka 2012) that it enables a
prosafeguards coalition to broaden the constituency of its
discourse considerably beyond the national policy arena,
including intergovernmental supporters of the national REDD+
processes such as the UN-REDD Programme (Peskett and Todd
2013). The same does not apply to the issue of national versus
nested REDD+ reward systems because nested approaches are
mostly considered a temporary phase in the process toward
national systems (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen 2009).
Enabled by higher reputational power and a formal institutional
position as the leaders of the REDD+ strategy development
process, ultimately deciding the strategy content, the task force–
led coalition could easily hold on to the REDD+ trust fund
approach.  
An interesting feature of the Tanzanian REDD+ policy debate
is the ambiguity of the discourse of the government actors, also
reflected in the strategy texts, which members of the opposing
coalition considered to be an obstacle to meaningful deliberative
exchange. Although clear and concise story lines have been
considered conducive for gaining dominance and discursive
institutionalization (Leifeld and Haunss 2012), strategic
avoidance of concise statements and hiding behind a discourse of
ambiguity may be an effective means to fend off  competing
discourses and more open and reflexive deliberation on the pros
and cons of each approach. This was perhaps illustrated in the
treatment of the tenure issue in the policy process. The global
push for decentralization of forest and natural resource
governance (e.g., Colfer et al. 2008, German et al. 2010, Larson
et al. 2010) resonates with the discourse of the CSO coalition, but
effectively implemented tenure reform will clearly have profound
impacts on government power bases. Grainger and Konteh (2007)
note how the subtle use of ambiguity by policy makers has proved
effective in resisting foreign influence. Nonetheless, ambiguity in
REDD+ can in part be linked to uncertainty about the future
global architecture of REDD+, the demand for verified emission
reductions, and corresponding payments, which will affect the
national arrangements as well.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of the REDD+ policy discourse coalitions in
Tanzania has demonstrated that discursive policy analysis
provides useful insights into the dynamics of REDD+ policy
processes and the influence of various policy coalitions on policy
decisions. As such, it helps to scrutinize the expectations of greater
effectiveness and legitimacy attached to multiactor, multilevel
governance. Although a number of actors formally took part in
the drafting of the national REDD+ strategy, the output reflected
mostly the discourse of the dominant government-centered
coalition. The dominance of the government coalition was
essentially related to its positional power enabled by the relevant
institutional structures. Although the CSO coalition conformed
to some of the characteristics of a dominant coalition in other
contexts, i.e., stable and consistent messages by key actors with
high ideational congruence and united, concerted political action
(Leifeld and Haunss 2012), it clearly came second in the contest
for discourse institutionalization. In sum, combining discursive
explanations with structural or resource-oriented policy analysis
may strengthen the explanatory power of both (Leifeld and
Haunss 2012). The particular value of this approach lies in helping
to explain why conflict persists even when actors pursue seemingly
similar objectives, such as environmentally effective and socially
equitable REDD+ policies.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6536
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